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Abstract 
The China—Rare Earths decision of the Appellate Body addressed two main issues: (i) whether 
China’s obligations not to impose export duties under its accession protocol are subject to exceptions 
under Article XX of GATT, and (ii) the scope of the exception for China’s export quota measures 
relating to conservation under Article XX(g) of GATT. In accord with its China—Raw Materials 
decision, the Appellate Body found that there is no textual basis for application of the Article XX 
exception to China’s export duty obligations. This interpretation exalted a narrow contextual approach 
over an approach to interpretation that would focus on broader context, object, and purpose. The 
Appellate Body also approved the Panel’s overall approach to determining the availability of the 
Article XX(g) exception. This approach focused on the design and structure of China’s quota measure, 
but left unresolved important issues, including the extent to which non-conservation purposes may 
prevent use of the exception and the role of empirical evidence of effects in these determinations. 
While the Appellate Body found that there is no “even-handedness” requirement in Article XX(g) 
itself, we argue that the chapeau’s requirement of non-discrimination is an appropriate additional 
criterion for determining whether a policy with a target of reducing extraction of a natural resource 
satisfies the requirements of Article XX. 
Keywords 
WTO Article XX, Dispute Settlement. 
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1. Introduction: Major Economic and Legal Issues* 
This Appellate Body decision
1
 arose from complaints by the United States, the European Union, and 
Japan against China’s export duties and export quotas on rare earths, tungsten, and molybdenum.  
The complainants requested Panel findings that the relevant export duties were inconsistent with 
Paragraph 11.3 of China’s Accession Protocol (the “CAP”), which states that "China shall eliminate 
all taxes and charges applied to exports unless specifically provided for in Annex 6 of this Protocol or 
applied in conformity with the provisions of Article VIII of the GATT 1994." The relevant export 
duties were not specifically provided for in Annex 6. Notably, the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT 1994) generally does not restrict export duties, so this is a GATT-plus obligation.  
The complainants also requested the Panel to find that the relevant export quotas violate Article 
XI:1 of GATT 1994.  
China conceded, and the Panel found, that China’s export duties and quotas violated these 
provisions, but China sought to defend them under Article XX(b) and XX(g) of GATT 1994, 
respectively.
2
 While it is clear that Article XX of GATT 1994 applies to provide exceptions with 
respect to violations of Article XI of GATT by virtue of China’s export quotas, one of the issues in 
this case was the applicability of Article XX to China’s GATT-plus obligation to eliminate export 
duties under the CAP. The Panel considered whether the obligation in Paragraph 11.3 of the CAP is 
subject to the general exceptions contained in Article XX, and, even though a majority of the Panel 
found that it is not, the Panel also considered the hypothetical application of Article XX(b) to China’s 
violation of Paragraph 11.3. However, the Panel found that the Panel China "failed to demonstrate that 
its export duties are designed and structured to protect human, animal or plant life or health." (para. 
7.171) 
This case was preceded by the Appellate Body’s decision in China—Raw Materials (Bronckers and 
Maskus, 2014; Qin, 2012),
3
 which also considered the question of the availability of the general 
exceptions contained in Article XX in connection with Paragraph 11.3 of the CAP. In China-Rare 
Earths, China did not appeal the Panel’s finding that Article XX does not apply to its export duty 
obligations, but instead limited its appeal to some of the Panel’s related reasoning.  
2. Background and Facts 
This case addressed claims against China’s export duties and export restrictions on rare earths, 
tungsten, and molybdenum. “Rare earths” includes a group of 17 elements with special properties of 
magnetism, luminescence and strength, important in the production of high tech products, including 
weapons systems and clean energy products. China is the dominant producer of rare earths, providing 
approximately 97% of the world supply (Morrison and Tang, 2012). “Rare earth deposits often contain 
                                                     
*
 The authors are grateful for comments on previous drafts of this article by participants in the European University 
Institute Conference on The WTO Case Law of 2014, and especially Chad Bown, Adam Chilton, William Davey, 
Jennifer Hillman, Rob Howse, Petros Mavroidis, and Mark Wu.  
1
 Appellate Body Report, China – Measures Related to the Exportation of Rare Earths, Tungsten, and Molybdenum, 
WT/DS431,432,433/AB/R, adopted 29 August 2014 (hereinafter Rare Earths Appellate Body Reports). 
2
 It appears that China chose to defend its export duties under Article XX(b) because, for the export duties, there was no 
domestic restriction as required for the defense under Article XX(g). Panel Report, China – Measures Related to the 
Exportation of Rare Earths, Tungsten and Molybdenum, WT/DS431,432,433/R, 13 December 2013, paras. 7.172–179. 
(hereinafter Rare Earths Panel Reports). 
3
 Appellate Body Reports, China – Measures Related to the Exportation of Various Raw Materials, WT/DS394/AB/R, 
WT/DS395/AB/R, WT/DS398/AB/R, adopted 22 February 2012 (hereinafter Raw Materials Appellate Body Reports). 
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radioactive elements, which means separating the metals requires costly and strenuous processes that 
produce a number of toxic pollutants and hazardous waste material” (Morrison and Tang, 2012). In 
other words, rare earth production causes serious production externalities.  
Between 2005 and 2010, Chinese export quotas on rare earths were cut by more than 50%, 
resulting in a more than seven-fold increase in world prices. In light of the importance of these 
products for national security and environmental applications, these price increases generated 
substantial public concern in the US, Japan, and European Union. In the US, 14 bills were introduced 
in the US Congress to address the availability of rare earths.  
3. Relation of China Accession Protocol (CAP) to GATT Art. XX 
The first substantive legal issue addressed at the Panel level was the question of whether Article 11.3 
of the CAP, the provision prohibiting the relevant export duties, is subject to defenses under Article 
XX of GATT. Article XX of GATT, by its terms, provides that “nothing in this Agreement shall be 
construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of [listed] measures . . . . 
“(emphasis added). So, in order for the CAP obligation to be eligible for an Article XX defense, the 
relevant provisions of the CAP must somehow be included in “this Agreement”—in the GATT—or 
the Article XX exceptions must be incorporated by reference in the CAP. However, the obligations in 
Article 11.3 are GATT-plus obligations, which do not textually form part of “this Agreement” as 
referenced in the chapeau of Article XX. Nor is there a plausible textual basis for arguing that the 
Article XX exceptions are incorporated by reference.  
A. The Raw Materials Appellate Body Report and the Role of Precedent 
The issue of availability of Article XX of GATT 1994 was not new. In an earlier, and similar case, 
China—Raw Materials, the EU, Mexico, and the US successfully challenged China’s restrictions on 
exports of certain “raw materials”—bauxite, coke, fluorspar, magnesium, manganese, silicon carbide, 
silicon metal, yellow phosphorus and zinc. In that case, the Appellate Body upheld the Panel’s 
determination and held that "a proper interpretation of Paragraph 11.3 of China's Accession Protocol 
does not make available to China the exceptions under Article XX of the GATT 1994." (para. 307) 
While there is no formal doctrine of binding precedent in WTO jurisprudence, the Appellate Body 
tends to insist on Panels following its earlier decisions, and Panels tend to do so. In addition, the 
Appellate Body seeks to maintain consistency among its decisions across time. In the present case, 
however, China asserted "new arguments that have not been asserted previously, or arguments which 
were neither argued nor addressed fully by the Panel and the Appellate Body in China—Raw 
Materials."
4
 Referring to the Appellate Body report in US—Stainless Steel (Mexico), where the 
Appellate Body stated that "absent cogent reasons, an adjudicatory body will resolve the same legal 
question in the same way in a subsequent case,"
5
 China argued that there were “cogent reasons” here.  
B. Contrario Arguments and Textualism 
The issue of the role of Article XX in connection with the CAP has been troublesome in several 
contexts. In China—Publications, the Appellate Body agreed with China’s argument that the 
introductory clause of paragraph 5.1 of the CAP, which reads: "Without prejudice to China's right to 
regulate trade in a manner consistent with the WTO Agreement," implicitly incorporates by reference 
                                                     
4
 Rare Earths, First Written Submission of China, paras. 416 and 460.  
5
 Appellate Body Report, United States – Final Anti-Dumping Measures on Stainless Steel from Mexico, 
WT/DS344/AB/R, adopted 20 May 2008, paras. 160-162.  
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Article XX of GATT.
 6
 According to the Appellate Body’s determination in China—Raw Materials, 
that incorporation is only for the purpose of Article 5.1, and serves as a contrario evidence that a 
similar limitation does not apply also where it is not expressed, as in Article 11.3 of the CAP.
7
 
Furthermore, in the China—Raw Materials case, the Appellate Body drew an a contrario inference 
from the references to GATT 1994 in Articles 11.1 and 11.2 of the CAP.
8
  
This type of a contrario argument can easily be reversed (Trachtman 2013): if the limitation makes 
sense in Article 5.1, or in Articles 11.1 and 11.2, of course it also makes substantive sense in Article 
11.3. However, the latter approach assumes a certain level of incompetence, or at least inconsistency, 
on the part of the drafters, and the WTO dispute settlement process has generally declined to assume 
incompetence or inconsistency. Rather, it uses an effet utile
9
 approach to give meaning to differences 
in expression across different provisions of WTO law.  
However, there is a normatively appealing non-textual basis for applying the Article XX exceptions 
to China’s CAP Article 11.3 obligations, and it is the same normative basis as that which must have 
motivated the inclusion of Article XX in the original GATT: states expected to encounter 
circumstances in which their GATT/WTO obligations should yield to other policy goals, and Article 
XX is the major basis, in connection with trade in goods, for distinguishing between acceptable and 
unacceptable claims for exception. Evidence of the desire to achieve this balance between trade and 
the “right to regulate” can be found in the context, object, and purpose of the WTO Agreements. In the 
China—Raw Materials dispute, the Appellate Body held that “we understand the WTO Agreement, as 
a whole, to reflect the balance struck by WTO Members between trade and non-trade-related 
concerns.” (para. 306) 
Under Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), treaties are to be 
interpreted according to the ordinary meaning of their terms in context and in light of the treaty’s 
object and purpose. According to the ordinary meaning of the word “comprise” in Article 31 itself, 
interpreted using the expressio unius principle of interpretation,
10
 “context” is limited to the text, 
including preambular language and annexes, as well as agreements and instruments made or accepted 
by all the parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty. It is uncertain whether the authors of 
the VCLT intended to exclude other elements.
11
 However, there is ample preambular language, for 
example in the first preamble of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization, to support the desire to balance trade and non-trade concerns.  
While it is difficult to separate text from context, the Appellate Body has generally given priority to 
text and to a narrow type of context, focusing on comparing words used in different provisions and to 
giving effet utile to differences, as compared to object and purpose, and as compared to a broader 
sense of context. In this case the result is a restriction of the right to regulate that is difficult to justify 
in substantive terms. For example, no one has proposed a policy-based explanation for why export 
                                                     
6
 Appellate Body Report, China—Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services for Certain Publications 
and Audiovisual Entertainment Products, WT/DS363/AB/R, adopted 19 January 2010 (hereinafter China—Publications). 
7
 Raw Materials Appellate Body Reports, para. 291. 
8
 In this context, an a contrario argument suggests that if a rule or qualification is stated in one place, and not stated in 
another place within the same agreement or statute, it is inappropriate to infer the rule or qualification in the latter place. 
It recognizes that positive statements can serve as the basis for negative inferences. 
9
 Effet utile is the interpretive principle that each term in a treaty, and each difference in expression, is to be given 
meaning, and not reduced to “inutility.”  
10
 Expressio unius is a canon of interpretation that infers that the express mention of particular items is intended to exclude 
other items of that type.  
11
 For an argument that they did not, see Isabelle Van Damme (2009), Treaty Interpretation by the WTO Appellate Body, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 218-19. 
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duties would be ineligible for an Article XX exception while export quotas can take advantage of 
Article XX.  
In China—Raw Materials, China rejected "the view that China has not only assumed uniquely 
onerous obligations regarding export duties on goods, but that it has also abandoned its right to use 
export duties under exceptional circumstances to promote fundamental non-trade interests explicitly 
recognized by the WTO Agreement."
12
 In China—Rare Earths, China emphasized that it "finds 
repugnant the argument that it has not only assumed uniquely onerous obligations, but also that it is 
denied its 'inherent power' to take measures in relation to these uniquely onerous obligations to 
promote other fundamental interests, such as conservation and public health."
13
 
As the Panel in the present case recounted, “in China – Raw Materials, the Appellate Body 
concluded that the WTO Agreement ‘reflect[s] the balance struck by WTO Members between trade 
and non-trade-related concerns’, but that ‘none of the objectives [contained in WTO agreement 
preambles], nor the balance struck between them, provides specific guidance’ on the question of 
whether Article XX of the GATT 1994 is applicable to Paragraph 11.3 of China's Accession 
Protocol.”14 It is not specific guidance, but it is important as a source of agreed context, object, and 
purpose for interpretation. China argued in China—Rare Earths that the Appellate Body's "summary 
dismissal of the interpretative value of the WTO's fundamental objectives without any further 
explanation [in China—Raw Materials] does not rise to the level of a proper objective assessment of 
legal issues before it.”15 It is a rather limited approach to interpretation.  
The Panel in Rare Earths seemed to come close to agreeing with China, stating that “in sum, the 
Panel agrees with China that an interpretation of the covered agreements that resulted in sovereign 
States being legally prevented from taking measures that are necessary to protect the environment or 
human, animal or plant life or health would likely be inconsistent with the object and purpose of the 
WTO Agreement.” (para. 7.114) It did not explain how it determined that the text-based aspect of the 
interpretation that it followed supervenes the agreement’s broader context, object, and purpose. But it 
pointed out, apparently as consolation, that, under the Panel’s interpretation, China foregoes only one 
policy instrument for use in carrying out the “right to regulate”: export duties. (paras. 7.111-7.117) 
Apparently, the Panel’s argument is that China retained sufficient alternatives so that it was not 
prevented from protecting these values, and so this interpretation is not actually inconsistent with the 
object and purpose of the WTO Agreement. Here, the Panel uses a very broad understanding of object 
and purpose, avoiding an interpretation that the object and purpose of the WTO Agreement is, in part, 
instantiated in Article XX itself.  
Why did the Panel then feel that it must prioritize ordinary meaning above broader context, object, 
and purpose? There are good practical reasons why the Appellate Body has, since the founding of the 
WTO, focused on text, including the fact that for many sources of object and purpose, “most treaties 
have no single, undiluted object and purpose but rather a variety of different, and possibly conflicting, 
objects and purposes.”16 The VCLT does not determine the relative weight of (i) ordinary meaning, (ii) 
context, or (ii) object and purpose. In international legal adjudication this weighing is implicitly 
assigned to the judge. It is not clear that the application of the VCLT interpretive rules should vary by 
context, allowing WTO judges to apply them differently than other judges. Even if they may do so, 
perhaps the pendulum has swung too far in the direction of a limited textualism divorced from broader 
context.  
                                                     
12
 First Written Submission of China, para. 459. 
13
 Raw Materials Panel Reports, Annex D-2, p. D-17, para. 24. 
14
 Ibid., para. 7.71, citing Appellate Body Reports, China – Raw Materials, para. 306. 
15
 First Written Submission of China, para. 448; Rare Earths Panel Reports, para. 7.110. 
16
 Appellate Body Report, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R, 
adopted 6 November 1998 (hereinafter Shrimp Appellate Body Report), para. 17. 
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C. The Meaning of Integration 
In China—Rare Earths, China introduced an argument that it asserted had not been raised in China—
Raw Materials. China argued that under Article 1.2 of the CAP, the CAP is an “integral part” of the 
WTO Agreement. China argued that Article 1.2 makes different parts of the CAP integral parts of the 
substantively related WTO agreement. According to this argument, the provisions of the CAP that 
relate, for example, to the TRIPS portion of the WTO Agreement, are an integral part of the TRIPS, 
while, as salient here, Article 11.3 of the CAP is an integral part of the GATT 1994.
17
 China also 
referred to Article XII:1 of the Marrakesh Agreement, which provides that a State "may accede to this 
Agreement, on terms to be agreed between it and the WTO. Such accession shall apply to this 
Agreement and the Multilateral Trade Agreements annexed thereto."  
The majority of the Panel found that while the CAP is an integral part of the WTO Agreement, no 
particular provision of the CAP is an integral part of any particular WTO sub-agreement, such as the 
GATT 1994. (para. 7.82) The majority of the Panel also found that the integration that China argued 
for would render specific cross-references—to GATT or to specific provisions of GATT—inutile, and 
on this basis rejected such integration. (paras. 7.86-7.87) This is a typical WTO a contrario 
interpretative tactic, in which if a term is present in one place, it is assumed that it was not intended to 
apply in other places.  
A dissenting panelist agreed with China to the effect that Article 11.3 of the CAP is an integral part 
of GATT 1994, and therefore eligible for exceptions under Article XX. (paras. 7.3.2.1.8 – 7.138) 
Perhaps encouraged by the dissent, China appealed the Panel’s rejection of its argument that paragraph 
11.3 of the CAP must be treated as an integral part of the GATT 1994. This question turns on an 
interpretation of Article XII:1 of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization, as well as Article 1.2 of the CAP. Article XII:1 of the Marrakesh Agreement provides as 
follows: “[any] accession shall apply to this Agreement and the Multilateral Trade Agreements 
annexed thereto.” 
This language seems intended to ensure that acceding states accept the single undertaking including 
all the Multilateral Trade Agreements.
18
 In addition, Article II:2 of the Marrakesh Agreement provides 
that the Multilateral Trade Agreements are integral parts of the Marrakesh Agreement. It is all one 
treaty, including the Multilateral Trade Agreements.  
On appeal, the Appellate Body rejected China’s line of argument, holding that “Article XII:1 itself 
does not speak to the question of the specific relationship between individual provisions of an 
accession protocol and individual provisions of the Marrakesh Agreement and the Multilateral Trade 
Agreements.” (para. 5.34) 
China made a similar argument based on Article 1.2 of the CAP, which provides that "[t]his 
Protocol, which shall include the commitments referred to in paragraph 342 of the Working Party 
Report, shall be an integral part of the WTO Agreement." China’s logic was that if “the WTO 
Agreement” includes GATT 1994, then the CAP is an integral part of GATT 1994, and thus Article 
11.3 of the CAP would be eligible for Article XX exceptions. As noted above, Article II:2 of the 
Marrakesh Agreement (the WTO Agreement) provides that the Multilateral Trade Agreements are 
integral parts of the Marrakesh Agreement.
19
  
                                                     
17
 Rare Earths Panel Reports, para. 7.75.  
18
 Rare Earths Appellate Body Reports, para. 5.33.  
19
 The Marrakesh Agreement and the WTO Agreement are the same thing. Although the Appellate Body, like the Panel in 
this case, followed the convention of using "the Marrakesh Agreement" to refer to the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing 
the World Trade Organization excluding its annexes, this was without prejudice to the question of whether references to 
the Marrakesh Agreement in the CAP meant such agreement with or without its annexes. 
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Article 1.3 of the CAP refers to the WTO Agreement and the Multilateral Trade Agreements 
separately, and from this context, the Appellate Body inferred that the reference to the WTO 
Agreement in Article 1.2 of the CAP includes the WTO Agreement (artificially) separated from the 
Multilateral Trade Agreements. Thus, the Appellate Body rejected the argument that the CAP is an 
integral part of the GATT 1994.  
The Appellate Body concluded that the term “WTO Agreement” means different things in different 
places, but it did “not consider that determining the scope of the term ‘the WTO Agreement’ in 
Paragraph 1.2 was dispositive of the key legal question before the Panel, that is, the specific 
relationship between individual provisions of China's Accession Protocol and the individual provisions 
of the Marrakesh Agreement and the Multilateral Trade Agreements.” (para. 5.49)  
Thus, the relationship among different provisions of the broad WTO Agreement depends on the 
particular context of those provisions. The Appellate Body gave the example of cumulative application 
of the Safeguards Agreement and Article XIX of GATT 1994,
20
 as well as the more salient example of 
the China—Publications decision, in which it observed that "whether China may, in the absence of a 
specific claim of inconsistency with the GATT 1994, justify its measure under Article XX of the 
GATT 1994 must in each case depend on the relationship between the measure found to be 
inconsistent with China's trading rights commitments, on the one hand, and China's regulation of trade 
in goods, on the other hand."
21
  
So, given that the integration arguments produced no conclusion, the Appellate Body returned to 
expressio unius arguments about Article 11.3 of the CAP itself. That is, it referred to the finding of the 
Appellate Body in China—Raw Materials that the fact that Article 11.3 already states some exceptions 
to China’s export duty elimination obligations indicates that no other exceptions were contemplated. 
(para. 5.63) 
The language that forms the basis for China’s integration arguments is not a model of clarity, and 
China’s arguments are at least plausible interpretations. As the Appellate Body recognized, there is a 
good argument that the text itself is unclear on whether particular provisions of the CAP are “integral 
parts” of GATT 1994. Indeed, specific references incorporating GATT 1994 or its provisions in the 
CAP would have been rendered inutile by a reading that all of the GATT 1994-related provisions of 
the CAP are already integral parts of GATT 1994. However, there is much in WTO law, and in the 
CAP, that is inutile. For example, Articles 11.1 and 11.2 of the CAP are both clearly inutile, as they 
simply call for compliance with GATT 1994. So avoiding inutility is not a foolproof canon of 
interpretation.  
Under these circumstances of indeterminate text, it might be argued that broader context, object, 
and purpose would be emphasized as interpretive bases under Article 31 of the VCLT for determining 
the relationship between Article 11.3 of the CAP and the exceptions contained in GATT 1994 (Horn 
and Weiler, 2005). However, again, the Appellate Body focused on ordinary meaning, combined with 
the limited contextual arguments based on expressio unius and effet utile.  
4. Application of Article XX(g) 
There was no doubt that China could seek to defend its quotas under Article XX. China conceded that 
its export quotas violated Article XI of GATT 1994, so the question was whether they could be 
excepted under Article XX(g). In order to qualify for an exception under Article XX(g), the relevant 
measure must (i) relate to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources, (ii) be made effective in 
                                                     
20
 Appellate Body Report, Argentina – Safeguard Measures on Imports of Footwear, WT/DS121/AB/R, adopted 12 January 
2000, para. 97. 
21
 China—Publications Appellate Body Report, para. 229. 
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conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption, and (iii) satisfy the requirement 
of the chapeau of Article XX to the effect that it not be applied as arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination, or a disguised restriction on trade. The burden of proof for each of these parameters is 
on the respondent. The Panel found that China did not meet this burden of proof as to any of rare 
earths, tungsten, or molybdenum. 
China appealed two sets of intermediate findings in the Panel's analysis of whether China's export 
quotas on rare earths, tungsten, and molybdenum were justified pursuant to Article XX(g).
22
  
 First, China argued that the Panel erred in its interpretation and application of Article XX(g) of 
the GATT 1994 in finding that China's export quotas on rare earths and tungsten do not "relate 
to" conservation within the meaning of Article XX(g).  
 Second, China argued that the Panel erred in finding that China's export quotas on rare earths, 
tungsten, and molybdenum are not "made effective in conjunction with" domestic restrictions 
under Article XX(g).  
We first provide an economic analysis of the effects of an export quota and then evaluate the legal 
arguments in light of the economic analysis. 
A. Economic Analysis of an Export Quota 
China argued that its export quota induced foreign consumers to diversify their sources of supply, and 
that the resulting fall in output was sufficient to establish that its policies “relate to” conservation. The 
complainants argued that another effect of the quotas was to increase Chinese consumption of rare 
earth products, which was not consistent with the argument that the policy was related conservation. 
We first show that both these claims regarding a Chinese export quota are correct: it will decrease 
Chinese output and raise Chinese consumption. Therefore, consumption in the rest of the world 
(ROW) will fall by more than the decline in Chinese output. We then discuss how Chinese 
consumption taxes, production taxes, and trade policies might be used to achieve a conservation target 
while satisfying the requirements of Article XX. 
The effects of an export quota on a natural resource are illustrated in Figure 1. Panel (a) shows the 
Chinese market for rare earths and panel (b) shows the market for rare earths in the rest of the world.  
The )( cC pD  and )( cC pS curves are the Chinese demand and supply curves, respectively, where pp 
is the Chinese producer price and 
cp is the Chinese consumer price. The demand curve in the right 
hand panel, )( wROW pD , is the demand for Chinese exports of rare earths in the ROW, which depends 
on the ROW market price. The supply of exports by China to the ROW is simply the difference 
between Chinese supply and Chinese demand, and is illustrated by the X
C
 schedule. If China follows a 
free trade policy and does not impose taxes on domestic consumers and producers, then 
wpc ppp  . The equilibrium price will be the one at which Chinese export supply equals ROW 
demand, which is shown by p0 in Figure1. 
                                                     
22
 China did not appeal the Panel’s finding, made on an arguendo basis, that the export duties at issue are not justified by 
either subparagraph (b) or the chapeau of Article XX of the GATT 1994. Because of the limited scope of China’s appeal, 
even if China had won its appeal, it would still have lost the case.  
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Figure 1 
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Suppose that China has a goal of reducing extraction of rare earths from the free trade quantity, 
SQ0 , to 
a lower level Q , in order to conserve rare earths. In order to accomplish this goal, it must reduce the 
price received by Chinese producers to
pp1 , which is the price at which they will extract the desired 
quantity Q . This goal can be accomplished if China imposes an export quota of X , which makes the 
export supply curve of China vertical at X  as illustrated by the dotted line in Figure 1b. By limiting 
foreign demand to X , this export quota has the effect of driving the Chinese price down to 
pp1 , which 
hits the target for reduced output. The reduced supply to market in the rest of the world drives the 
price paid by consumers up to 
wp1  in Figure 1b. Note however that since there is no tax on Chinese 
consumers of the product, their price will be the same as that of Chinese producers. Consumers of rare 
earths in China will benefit from the drop in price and will increase their consumption to point 
DQ1 . 
Although the export quota by itself can be used to reduce the extraction of the resource to Q  by 
driving up the world price of rare earths and discouraging foreign consumption, it also has the 
perverse effect of making the price to Chinese consumers of rare earths lower, so that their 
consumption actually increases. The complainants argued that this indicated that the real intention of 
the policy was to further the development of the downstream industries in China that used rare earths, 
and to encourage foreign firms using rare earths to move their production facilities to China. 
If the Chinese policy is intended to reduce extraction of rare earths, how should that reduced supply 
be split between consumers in China and foreign consumers? Economic efficiency suggests a simple 
solution, which is that the price of Chinese products should be the same for both Chinese and foreign 
consumers. The reduced output under the conservation policy should be allocated to its most 
productive uses, which requires consumers in all locations facing the same price. Note that this 
outcome is also the one that satisfies the requirement of the chapeau that "such measures are not 
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applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination 
between countries where the same conditions prevail." 
The question of how the allocation of the reduced output of tungsten and rare earths between 
Chinese and foreign consumers is affected by Chinese trade and domestic policies can be illustrated 
using  
 Figure 2. The horizontal axis in Figure 2 has lengthQ , which is the target level of Chinese output 
under the conservation policy from Figure 1. The vertical axis in Figure 2 measures the consumer 
price. The demand for rare earths by Chinese consumers,
CD , is measured from left to right, and the 
demand for Chinese rare earths by the rest of the world (ROW), 
ROWD  , is measured from right to 
left. For any point on the horizontal axis, the point above it on 
CD shows the Chinese price and the 
point on 
ROWD shows the foreign price associated with that allocation. Any policy that we consider 
must result in a price 
pp1  to producers, since that is the price at which they supply the target quantity 
Q . The Chinese exports quota of X  illustrated in Figure 1 results in Chinese consumption of 
DQ1 and a price differential of Xt  between the price in China and the price in ROW as indicated in 
Figure 2.  
 The only allocation of output that results in the same price in both markets is the point at which 
CD  and ROWD intersect, resulting in consumption 
DQ2  in China and exports of 
DQQ 2  for 
consumption in ROW. The simplest way to achieve this outcome is to impose a tax on Chinese 
producers of pt  as shown in Figure 2. Under a production tax, the reduced supply of the good drives 
up the price to consumers in all locations by the same amount. As explained in more detail below, the 
production tax will satisfy the requirement of the chapeau of Article XX, since it does not discriminate 
between consumers. 
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Figure 2. 
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Since under an export quota the price to Chinese consumers is equal to the price paid to Chinese 
producers, a tax on Chinese consumers is required in conjunction with the export tax in order to 
eliminate the price gap between Chinese and foreign consumers. Referring to Figure 2, the Chinese 
export quota must be set at 
DQQ 2 , and then combined with a tax on Chinese consumers of pt . The 
consumer tax is required to raise the price sufficiently that Chinese consumers choose the quantity 
DQ2 . Thus, an export quota can be part of a conservation policy that satisfies the non-discrimination 
requirement of the chapeau if it is accompanied by a consumption tax that eliminates the perverse 
incentive to consumers. Note however that the conservation policy can always be satisfied without the 
use of an export policy (whether quota or tax) by the use of a production tax. The use of a production 
tax avoids the complication of having to match the consumer tax to the price gap introduced by the 
export quota, and is thus a much more direct approach. 
In evaluating the "related to" requirement of Article XX(g), the Panel (7.446-7.448) argued that the 
Chinese policy was not related to conservation because it was not shown to raise the price to Chinese 
consumers. Note that the Panel’s requirement of evidence that Chinese prices would rise in connection 
with the “related to” criterion is also addressed by the “made effective in conjunction with domestic 
restrictions” criterion, as well as by the chapeau. However, if the chapeau’s requirement of non-
discrimination is met, we would expect to see a price rise in China satisfying this “related to” test, and 
also satisfaction of the “made effective in conjunction with” test. Thus, the chapeau addresses the 
concerns likely to be included in the “made effective in conjunction with” test, as was the case here. 
Furthermore, the inclusion of a requirement for domestic price rises in the “related to” test seems 
redundant in respect of both the “made effective in conjunction with” test and the chapeau. 
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 Referring to Figure 2, p0 denotes the initial price of rare earths in China before the export tax policy 
was put in place. Note that any policy that results in Chinese consumption between quantities A and B 
will result in a higher price to consumers in both China and foreign countries when the conservation 
target is Q . However, only a policy that achieves Chinese consumption of DQ2  will satisfy the 
requirement of the chapeau.  
China argued that it was using production policies (quotas and taxes) to conserve rare earths, and 
that export quotas were needed as a balancing tool to ensure that foreign consumers conserved natural 
resources. This argument is clearly flawed, since a production tax or quota in China will reduce 
supply, which raises the price to consumers in all locations. If an export quota is in place and restricts 
Chinese exports, it will raise the foreign consumer price above that in China. The way to eliminate that 
gap is through the use of a tax on Chinese consumers, not through a production tax. Referring to 
Figure 2, the efficient production tax of pt results in foreign consumption of 
DQQ 2 . 
Any export quota that is binding and restricts Chinese exports below this level will prevent the 
efficient outcome from being obtained. An export quota larger than 
DQQ 2  will allow the efficient 
allocation, but in that case the export quota is not binding. Thus, the only way that a production 
tax/export tax combination can achieve the desired allocation is one in which the export tax is 
redundant and can be removed without affecting the policy. 
The complainants provided overwhelming empirical evidence that the gap between the Chinese and 
world price of rare earths increased dramatically following the imposition of Chinese export quotas, 
indicating that Chinese domestic policies failed to offset the discriminatory effect of the export quota. 
Expert testimony in JE-169 concluded that in the 6 months following the tightening of the export 
quota, the export prices of 24 Chinese rare earth products doubled on average relative to the price of 
the products in the Chinese market. This finding is consistent with the arguments of the complainants 
that the program's main objective was to favor downstream producers using rare earths in China. 
China argued that its export quotas were non-discriminatory because they did not bind in some 
years for some products. Reductions in world demand for rare earths can result in the quota being non-
binding in some periods. This can be seen in Figure 1 by noting that a sufficiently large reduction in 
D
ROW
 will result in exports less than X . However, the existence of the quotas means that they can 
restrain exports in some conditions, and the evidence indicated that they were significant barriers to 
trade during much of the period.
 
An economically efficient conservation policy can simply be satisfied by a production tax, which 
will have a non-discriminatory effect on consumers in different markets. While it is possible to 
construct a policy package that uses an export quota in conjunction with consumption taxes, such a 
package would require continual adjustment of policies in response to changes in market condition to 
avoid discriminatory outcomes. Any policy intended to conserve natural resources that includes trade 
policy interventions should be viewed with considerable skepticism.  
B. Legal Analysis of China’s Article XX(g) Arguments 
There was no doubt that China could seek to defend its quotas under Article XX. China conceded that 
its export quotas violated Article XI of GATT 1994, so the question was whether they could be 
excepted under Article XX(g). China appealed two sets of intermediate findings in the Panel's analysis 
of whether China's export quotas on rare earths, tungsten, and molybdenum were justified pursuant to 
Article XX(g). First, China argued that the Panel erred in its interpretation and application of Article 
XX(g) of the GATT 1994 in finding that China's export quotas on rare earths and tungsten do not 
"relate to" conservation within the meaning of Article XX(g). Second, China argued that the Panel 
erred in finding that China's export quotas on rare earths, tungsten, and molybdenum are not "made 
effective in conjunction with" domestic restrictions under Article XX(g). 
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i. “Relating to” 
As to the “relating to” prong of the Article XX(g) test in connection with rare earths and tungsten, 
China only appealed the Panel’s rejection of one of its six arguments: the argument that China’s export 
quota on rare earths and tungsten sends a signal to foreign consumers of rare earth products to 
diversify their sources of supply and/or find substitutes for these products that they import from China. 
If this “signal” induces foreign consumers to diversify, China’s argument goes, then China’s export 
quota can be said to “relate to” conservation.  
The Appellate Body has moved beyond the requirement, expressed in US-Gasoline, that a measure 
be “primarily aimed at” conservation in order to satisfy the “relating to” criterion.23 Rather, there must 
be "a close and genuine relationship of ends and means" between that measure and the conservation 
objective.
24
 The Appellate Body stated in this case that “the text of Article XX(g) does not prescribe a 
specific analytical framework for assessing whether a measure satisfies the component requirements of 
that provision.” But it continued that “all the same, we observe that, in past disputes, the Appellate 
Body has emphasized the importance of the design and structure of the challenged measure to a proper 
assessment of whether a measure satisfies the requirements of Article XX(g).” (para. 5.96)  
The Panel based its decision that China’s export quotas do not “relate to” conservation on the 
Panel’s view that, while the quotas would induce conservation on the part of foreign consumers, they 
would also send a “perverse signal” of lower prices in the domestic market, inducing reduced 
conservation by domestic consumers. Consider the Panel’s statement on application of Article XX(g): 
[O]ur consideration of the design and architecture of China's export quota on rare earths does not 
convince us that the export quota is designed in such a way as to ensure that domestic demand is 
not stimulated by low prices. There does not appear to be any mechanism to ensure that the export 
quota is set at such a level that, in combination with the extraction and/or production caps, no 
perverse incentives will be sent to domestic consumers. (para. 7.448) 
The Panel seemed to demand that the design and structure reduce domestic consumption, not just 
overall consumption. As discussed above, the design and structure of an export quota in this context 
results in a reduction of foreign consumption in an amount greater than the increase in domestic 
consumption. Thus, in the most basic sense, there is no doubt that China’s production quota, 
considered alone, has the effect of reducing overall output, and thus consumption. Therefore, we must 
infer that something more than a narrow reduction of output is required in order to “relate to” 
conservation. There are two possible additional requirements: first, the Panel and Appellate Body 
might have required a purer intent, and second, they might have required greater conservation effect.  
Most of the Panel’s analysis of the extent to which China’s export quota relates to conservation 
focused on legislative intent, and the Panel found that, according to statements of legislative intent, 
China’s goal for this legislation was primarily industrial policy. (paras. 7.400-7.4006) The Panel found 
that the non-conservation goals expressed in the legislation prevented an inference of a conservation 
purpose, and found that the primary goal of China’s export quota was industrial policy. (paras. 7.398-
7.403) But it is not clear whether the fact that the legislation was primarily aimed at industrial policy is 
inconsistent with the proposition that it is “related to” conservation, or that it has a “close and genuine 
relationship of means and ends.” Is it possible to have a non-conservation primary goal, and still be 
“related to” conservation?  
The Panel examined design and structure, finding that while China’s measure would cause some 
reduction of foreign consumption, the “perverse incentives” expand domestic consumption. As 
discussed above, this is definitely true in theory and we would expect it to be true in practice. But the 
Panel never evaluated the magnitude of the foreign reduction, or the magnitude of the effect of the 
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 Raw Materials Appellate Body Reports, para. 355, citing Shrimp Appellate Body Report, para. 136.  
24
 Shrimp Appellate Body Report, para. 136.  
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perverse incentives. Our analysis shows that the design and structure reduces output. Note the 
language of the Panel’s statement quoted above: China must ensure that no perverse incentives are 
sent.  
Furthermore, to the extent that the Panel’s decision can be understood as based on the 
disproportionate effects on foreign consumers compared to domestic consumers, incorporating an 
“even handedness” requirement in the “related to” test seems less defensible than doing so in 
connection with the “made effective in conjunction with” requirement, as discussed below. Even 
handedness is definitely a requirement for economic efficiency, but is it a requirement of this 
component of Article XX(g)? Moreover, the fact that these considerations are specifically covered in 
the “made effective in conjunction with” requirement and in the chapeau makes it difficult to infer 
similar considerations in the “related to” test.  
The Appellate Body simply approved the Panel’s reasoning in this context. (para. 5.156) The 
Appellate Body went so far as to state that “we also consider that the Panel did not, as suggested by 
China, find that export quotas can send effective conservation signals to foreign users.” (para. 5.160) 
This statement does not seem to comport with what the Panel actually said (“the Panel accepts that 
export quotas do or at least can send conservation-related signals to foreign users”25), or with 
economic theory.  
The Appellate Body observed that a focus on “design and structure” allows the Panel to go beyond 
the text of the domestic measure, and even beyond ostensible intent, but then it agreed with the Panel, 
and with prior jurisprudence, that it is not necessary to determine the empirical effects of the measure. 
(para. 5.98) It is true, as the Appellate Body pointed out in US—Gasoline, that the empirical 
determination of effects is fraught with difficulties, not least of which are that no effects might be 
observed immediately.
26
 China complained that the Panel excluded evidence of effects. Indeed the 
Panel made the following statement: 
There is therefore no need for the Panel to decide, in quantitative or qualitative terms, precisely 
what level of contribution a challenged measure has made to the conservation objective. Instead, 
the Panel looks at the nature of the challenged measures to determine whether, as a matter of 
design and architecture, they assist, support or further the goal of conservation.
27
 
China argued that it was error to exclude evidence of actual effects, in cases where a respondent could 
not successfully show that its measure has the requisite design and structure.
28
 However, the Appellate 
Body disagreed with China’s characterization of the Panel’s findings. (para 5.108) The Panel merely 
found that assessment of actual effects was not necessary in this case, not that it was precluded. The 
Appellate Body stated that “in any event, where the design and structure of a challenged measure 
clearly illustrate the absence of a nexus between that measure and the conservation objective, it would 
be difficult to attribute the evidence of positive effects on conservation to that measure.” (para. 5.113) 
This is the familiar social science precept that without a theory of causation, we cannot attribute 
causation to correlated events. However, by stating that in this case there was an “absence of a nexus 
with the conservation objective, the Appellate Body seems to ignore the fact that China’s measure 
caused some reduction in output. Where the theory shows no causal role, it is true that there is no 
reason to look at the facts, but where, as here, the theory shows some causal role, the facts could be 
relevant.  
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 Rare Earths Panel Reports, para. 7.725. See also ibid., para. 7.443. 
26
 Gasoline Appellate Body Report, p. 20.  
27
 Rare Earths Panel Reports, para. 7.379, referring to Shrimp Appellate Body Report, para. 141. 
28
 Rare Earths China's Appellant's Submission, para. 155. 
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ii. Made Effective in Conjunction with Domestic Restrictions 
China’s other claim of error in connection with the Panel’s decision regarding Article XX(g) of GATT 
1994 had to do with the Panel’s statements to the effect that Article XX(g) includes a requirement of 
“even-handedness” as between national measures to conserve natural resources that otherwise violate 
GATT, on the one hand, and restrictions on domestic production or consumption, on the other hand. 
This concept exceeds the ordinary meaning of Article XX(g), which simply refers to measures "made 
effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption."  
The Appellate Body found that evenhandedness is not a separate requirement, but is a shorthand 
way that has been used to describe the requirement in Article XX(g) that the measure be made 
effective in conjunction with domestic restrictions. (para. 5124) The Panel did not express with perfect 
clarity whether it did consider evenhandedness a separate requirement, so the Appellate Body held that 
“the Panel erred to the extent that it found that ‘even-handedness’ is a separate requirement that must 
be fulfilled in addition to the condition that a measure be ‘made effective in conjunction with 
restrictions on domestic production or consumption.’” (para. 5127) 
Examining the question of whether the Panel erred in its application of this prong, the Appellate 
Body simply held that the restrictions on domestic production or consumption must be “real,” (para. 
5.132) but need not be “evenly distributed.” (para. 5.134) 
Here, one might observe that China, along with the Appellate Body, has identified an important 
avenue for evasion of what one might infer from the text and context was the object and purpose of 
Article XX(g): to ensure authenticity of concern for conservation by requiring that the major burden of 
the conservation is not imposed on foreign interests. It is arguable that the “made effective in 
conjunction with” language has the object and purpose of requiring even-handedness. So this is an 
example of a textualist interpretation leaving a possible substantive gap in the WTO object to restrain 
unjustified protectionism.  
The Appellate Body highlighted this concern, noting that “it would be difficult to conceive of a 
measure that would impose a significantly more onerous burden on foreign consumers or producers 
and that could still be shown to satisfy all of the requirements of Article XX(g). (para. 5.134) In any 
event, this avenue of potential avoidance is not very wide, because the chapeau of Article XX would 
be likely to deny an exception to measures that constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination, so long as the chapeau is understood as addressing the measure, and not just the way in 
which the measure is applied.  
Is the price differential between domestic consumers of the resource and those located in the rest of 
the world a justified price differential from the perspective of conservation? This is a critical question 
for the evaluation of “made effective in conjunction with domestic restrictions,” since the empirical 
evidence showed that prices of the relevant materials in China declined relative to world prices after 
the imposition of the export quota.  
If the objective of the policy is to reduce the quantity of the natural resource that is being extracted, 
then from the point of view of conservation it does not matter whether the consumers of that good 
reside in the home country or in the rest of the world. However, economic efficiency would argue for 
allocating this reduced quantity of the resource to its highest value uses, which would require the 
consumer prices to be equalized between home consumers and those in the rest of the world. The price 
differential resulting from an export quota could be interpreted as representing "a means of arbitrary or 
unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail" under the chapeau, 
and would thus not be eligible for protection under Article XX.  
A difficulty with the language of Article XX(g) is that the requirement that the trade policy be 
"made effective in conjunction with” domestic restrictions does not provide guidance about what 
forms of domestic policy or what levels of those policies are sufficient to make an export trade policy 
acceptable. The discussion in section 4(a) has shown that the use of a consumption tax of equal value 
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to the export trade restriction can achieve economic efficiency. However, the use of a consumption tax 
that is not of equal magnitude to the export trade restriction would not result in efficient resource 
allocation.  
The Appellate Body ruled that the language of Article XX(g) does not contain an 
“evenhandedness” requirement. In the absence of further guidance under Article XX(g), the 
requirement of non-discrimination under the chapeau seems the natural rule for evaluating the extent 
to which domestic regulations act in conjunction with export policies.  
China also challenged the Panel’s finding that the “made effective in conjunction with” 
requirement is to be evaluated, again, based only on structure and design, and not on actual effects. So, 
here, although the Appellate Body upheld the Panel’s reasoning on the basis that the Panel never 
stated that it was precluded from examining actual effects, it appears that examination of effects will 
rarely, if ever, be appropriate. The Appellate Body referred to its earlier response to China’s claim 
regarding “relating to,” stating, puzzlingly, that “the legal characterization of a measure cannot be 
contingent upon the occurrence of subsequent events.” (para. 5.138)  
This language is striking, because the plain language of Article XX(g)—asking whether a measure 
relates to conservation of exhaustible natural resources and whether it is made effective in conjunction 
with domestic restrictions on production or consumption—would ordinarily be understood as asking 
whether the measure actually conserves natural resources and whether domestic production or 
consumption is actually restricted. Here, the Appellate Body seems to have read into the text of Article 
XX(g) words of limitation that are not there.  
This counter-textual approach is especially striking when so closely juxtaposed with the Appellate 
Body and Panel’s exaltation of textualism over object and purpose in the context of its analysis of the 
availability of Article XX to except China’s export duties.  
Conclusion 
The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding included a specific reference to the customary 
international law rules of interpretation, understood to mean the provisions of the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties addressing interpretation. While the Appellate Body has taken this instruction 
to mean that it must focus on text, the relevant language of the Vienna Convention calls also for 
references to context, object, and purpose, and where those references leave the meaning obscure or 
absurd, to the circumstances of the treaty’s conclusion and its preparatory work.  
To be sure, the Appellate Body did utilize context in its interpretation in this case. In connection 
with its interpretation of the applicability of Article XX, it used an expressio unius approach to find 
that since there was no specific reference to Article XX in connection with the relevant provisions of 
the CAP, Article XX did not apply. But the expressio unius canon of interpretation is a passive means 
of interpretation, and can easily be reversed by reference to a more teleological approach to 
interpretation, as would be required by a reference to object and purpose in this case. Indeed, if we 
focus on preambular language in the WTO Charter calling for a balance between environmental 
protection and trade, and the context of Article XX qualifications available for comparable obligations 
of every other state (not to mention the fact that most other states are permitted to apply export duties 
without restriction), it is an abstemious textualism indeed that declines to extend Article XX 
exceptions to China’s export duties. 29  
So, the Appellate Body’s approach to textualism is not required by the instructions contained in the 
WTO treaty, and to the extent that it excludes object and purpose, it is not permitted (Qin, 2014). It is 
understandable that the Appellate Body would expect that textualism insulates it from criticism, and 
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 For a trenchant criticism of this limited approach to interpretation in a similar context, see Irwin and Weiler (2008).  
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deflects responsibility to the Member States. Thus, perhaps textualism was the right strategy for the 
early Appellate Body. As Hudec mentioned in the context of the Appellate Body’s approach to WTO 
legal rules restricting domestic regulation “recognizing (its) very exposed position, the Appellate Body 
may well have concluded that the safest refuge from political criticism was to stay as close as possible 
to the shelter of the legal texts accepted by governments” (Hudec, 1998). But is it still normatively 
attractive for a judge to leave the text as it stands, declining to amplify, limit, or correct the text?  
The WTO Agreement may be understood as a state-contingent contract containing obligations and 
exceptions, each dependent on findings of particular facts. The exceptions contained in Article XX of 
GATT may be understood as designed to provide a mechanism for relaxing WTO obligations where 
specified reasons apply and specified conditions are met. This serves to preserve WTO obligations, 
while ensuring that compliance with these obligations is not excessively costly in terms of other 
values, such as conservation of exhaustible natural resources.  
The Appellate Body’s approach to interpretation, focused as it is on text and a narrow approach to 
context, as evidenced in Rare Earths, may emphasize these interpretive elements under Article 31 of 
the VCLT excessively, providing insufficient emphasis on broader context, object, and purpose. The 
result in this case is to provide a rigid obligation with respect to China’s export duties on rare earths 
under Article 11.3 of the CAP, without benefit of the conditional exceptions under Article XX.  
Export quotas will not generally be economically efficient mechanisms for conservation of 
exhaustible natural resources. However, this does not necessarily mean that they cannot, under any 
circumstances, “relate to” conservation within the meaning of Article XX(g). While China’s export 
quota on rare earths could not meet the requirements of the Article XX chapeau, the Appellate Body 
confirmed the Panel’s approach to Article XX(g) in a way that makes it unclear how this defense will 
operate in the future.  
First, while the Appellate Body confirmed the Panel’s finding that the structure and design of 
China’s quota does not “relate to” conservation, it did not deal with the fact that the structure and 
design of China’s measure, in economic terms, will reduce output. While the narrow reduction of 
output may be insufficient to “relate to” conservation, neither the Panel nor the Appellate Body 
explains how China’s measure failed to meet the test. Perhaps the problem was that China’s measure 
was primarily addressed to industrial policy purposes. Perhaps the problem was that China’s measure 
failed to provide sufficient benefits in terms of conservation. If the problem was the latter, it would 
have been appropriate for the Panel to allow China to present evidence of the extent of conservation 
effects.  
Second, while the Appellate Body found that the “made effective in conjunction with domestic 
restrictions” prong of the Article XX(g) test does not require even-handedness, it did not provide 
guidance to future panels as to how to compare the magnitude of domestic restrictions to the 
magnitude of measures sought to be justified under Article XX(g). The Appellate Body also accepted 
the Panel’s determination not to examine empirical evidence offered by China of the conservation 
effects of its domestic measures compared to the conservation effects of its export quota. 
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